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THE STRICT NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE: WORKABLE
SOLUTION FOR FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO
PRESERVATION DESIGNATION OF RELIGIOUS
LANDMARKS?
S. Kathleen Pepper
The first amendment to the United States Constitution states
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."7 Infringements of
these clauses have been litigated on a wide variety of issues.2 Over
the past decade, some of the most controversial first amendment
litigation has involved alleged infringements on religious freedom
caused by state historic reservation regulations.3 The principal issue
is whether historic landmark4 designation of church-owned5 properties
impermissibly restricts a religious organization's free exercise of
1. U.S. CONST, amend. I.
2. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 110 S. Ct. 688
(1990) (sales and use taxes on the distribution of religious materials); Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988) (timber
harvesting in national forests areas traditionally used for religious purposes by
Native Americans); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (mandatory education
for minors up to age 16); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (unemployment
compensation); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closings as a
uniform day of rest); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child labor
laws); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (medical vaccinations);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (monogamous marriage).
3. See, e.g., St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 728 F. Supp. 958
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990) (landmark designation not an
infringement upon the Church's free exercise of religion), cert, denied, 111 S. Ct.
1103 (1991); Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, (Nos. 87-3168, 87-
4751, and 87-6586, Suffolk County Sup. Ct.) (Nov. 2, 1989) (landmark designation
not an infringement upon the Church's free exercise of religion); First Covenant
Church v. City of Seattle, 114 Wash. 2d 392, 787 P.2d 1352 (1990) (landmark
designation impermissibly infringed upon the Church's free exercise of religion).
See also Historic Preservation News, July 1990, at 1, col. 2.
4. The term "historic landmark" or "religious landmark" is used in this article
to refer to properties designated either as being included within an historic district
or as an individual historic landmark.
5. The word "church" is used generically to refer to bodies, organizations,
buildings, or properties of any and all fai ths and beliefs.
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religion by imposing affirmative duties upon the property owner and
subjecting property owners to criminal penalties where property is
not in compliance with statutory obligations. A less frequently
litigated issue is whether historic landmark designation of church-
owned property constitutes an impermissible establishment of religion.
Historic landmark designations are granted on the national
level by the National Park Service6 and on the state level by state
historic preservation offices.7 All nominations must meet specific
criteria in order to receive an historic register designation.8 Listing
6. The National Register of Historic Places, which lists all properties of
cultural significance worthy of preservation, serves as the model for the Register
of Historic Places administered by each state. 16 NAT'L REG. BULL. 3 (1986).
1. Id.
8. For example, the criteria required for a National Register designation are:
The quality of significance in American history, architecture,
archeology, and culture is present in districts, sites, buildings,
structures, and objects that possess integrity of location, design,
setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association, and:
A. that are associated with events that have made a significant
contribution to the broad patterns of our history; or
B. that are associated with the lives of persons significant in our past;
or
C. that embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or
method of construction or that represent the work of a master, or
that possess high artistic values, or that represent a significant and
distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual
distinction; or
D. that have yielded, or may be likely to yield, information in
prehistory or history.
Criteria Considerations (Exceptions): Ordinarily cemeteries,
birthplaces, or graves of historical figures, properties owned by
religious institutions or used for religious purposes, structures that
have been moved from their original locations, reconstructed
historic buildings, properties primarily commemorative in nature,
and properties that have achieved significance within the past 50
years shall not be considered eligible for the National Register.
However, such properties will qualify if they are integral parts of
districts that do meet the criteria or if they fall within the
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on the National or on a state Register indicates that the building or
property so designated represents an important aspect of American
history, architecture, archaeology, or culture.9 Although a specific
exception is granted for properties used for religious purposes or
owned by religious organizations, such properties may still be listed
if they are part of an historic district or meet additional criteria/"
Once official designation is received/7 listed properties are subject to
a variety of restrictions.72 These restrictions form the basis for free
exercise or establishment clause challenges to landmark status and to
preservation ordinances.
One way to interpret the conflict between the freedoms of
first amendment's two religion clauses and historic preservation
guidelines is through the strict neutrality principle. This principle
holds that the free exercise and the establishment clauses "should be
following categories:
A. a religious property deriving primary significance from architectural
or artistic distinction or historical importance; or ... (Exceptions
B - G omitted).
16 NAT'L REG. BULL. 1 (1986).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Many states require the property owner's consent to designate property as
an historic landmark. Virginia does not require consent prior to designation of
state landmarks. In 1989, the state of Washington decided that church-owned
property could not be nominated or designated as an historic landmark because
such actions constituted an infringement upon the religious institution's free
exercise of religion. To date, Washington is the first state to specifically exempt
church-owned property from the historic landmarks process. It remains to be seen
whether this decision constitutes the beginning of a trend or whether it represents
a minority view. T. BOASBERG, T. COUGHLIN & J. MILLER, PRESERVATION LAW
AND TAXATION §§ 7.03[7][b][iv], 7.03[8] (1986); M. DAVIS, PRESERVATION POLICY
RESEARCH: STATE SYSTEMS FOR DESIGNATING HISTORIC PROPERTIES AND THE
RESULTS OF DESIGNATION 12 (1987).
12. Common restrictions include, but are not limited to paint color, aluminum
siding, roofing materials, building additions, and building demolitions. In addition,
owners are required to maintain the condition of their listed properties.
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read as stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize
religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses,
read together as they should be, prohibit classification in terms of
religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden.";J
The purpose of this article is to determine whether the strict
neutrality approach to interpretation of the two religion clauses
provides a viable framework for analyzing alleged infringements of
the free exercise clause resulting from the affirmative duties imposed
by designation of property as a religious landmark74 under state
historic preservation regulations.^ The article begins by exploring the
development of the strict neutrality principle in the early 1960s and
its recent modifications. Next the article discusses the holding and
rationale of the most recent, and most controversial, religious
landmark case -- St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York.16 The
strict neutrality principle is then applied to the facts of the case, and
compared to the approach actually used by the courts. Finally, the
article discusses whether the strict neutrality principle offers a
workable solution to conflicts between religious landmarks and the
free exercise and establishment clauses of the first amendment.
THE STRICT NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE
Origins of the Strict Neutrality Principle
Strict neutrality was first seriously advocated as a doctrinal
13. P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE
SUPREME COURT 112 (1962) [hereinafter KURLAND].
14. While church-owned property most commonly refers to a principal religious
structure (often with related dependent religious buildings), it may also refer to a
formerly secular building constructed for residential or commercial use which has
been subsequently purchased by a religious organization.
15. This article does not address the issue of whether the criminal sanctions
provisions of state historic preservation regulations constitute an infringement of
a religious institution's free exercise of religion under the First Amendment.
16. 728 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert,
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
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approach to interpreting the two religion clauses of the first
amendment in the early 1960s.77 Under this theory, the free exercise
and the establishment clauses are read together as flip sides of the
same coin rather than as tension filled opposing commands.78
Utilizing a foundation of equal protection theory rather than due
process theory, the strict neutrality principle states that the free
exercise and the establishment clauses "must be read to mean that
religion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of
governmental action, whether that action be the conferring of rights
or privileges or the imposition of duties or obligations."79
Although Kurland's principle arguably offered a fair, even-
handed approach capable of resolving the inherent tensions between
the two religion clauses and between the treatment of religious and
secular actions and beliefs, it has not been wholeheartedly adopted
or consistently applied by the Supreme Court.20 Over the past few
years, however, the strict neutrality principle has been revisited,
providing the first serious scholarly analysis of the principle since its
origin.27 Consequently, the strict neutrality principle has been
modified in response to the criticisms it has engendered.
17. KURLAND, supra note 13, at 116. For other early commentary on the
neutrality principle, see Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). Contra Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in
Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661 (1960).
18. This point has been emphasized by modern scholars as well. See Paulsen,
Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to
Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 313 (1986)
[hereinafter Paulsen].
19. KURLAND, supra note 13, at 18. At the same time Kurland noted that this
approach should be used as a "starting point for solutions to problems brought
before the Court, not a mechanical answer to them." Id.
20. See Kelley, "Strict Neutrality" and the Free Exercise of Religion, in EQUAL
SEPARATION 18 (P. Weber ed. 1990) [hereinafter Kelley]; Tushnet, The Emerging
Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691 (1988).
21. EQUAL SEPARATION (P. Weber ed. 1990), at xi.
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Modifications of Kurland's Strict Neutrality Principle
James Madison advocated that since all religions are equal
before the law, they should be subject to the same treatment.22
Following this approach makes a unified interpretation of the two
religion clauses easier and provides for more coherent analysis than
does Thomas Jefferson's admonition that there should be "a wall of
separation between church and state."25 The separationist view
advocated by Jefferson, and frequently cited by the courts,
exacerbates the tension that exists between the two clauses and
prevents development of a single test that would allow the two
clauses to be read together harmoniously.2''
Neutrality, therefore, expresses a "principle of relationship, not
of content."25 The thrust of the strict neutrality principle is to treat
religious interests, whether on an individual or on an organizational
level, the same as other similarly situated26 persons and groups.27 In
22. See generally JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (R. Alley ed. 1985).
23. R. Healey, Thomas Jefferson's "Wall": Absolute or Serpentine? in EQUAL
SEPARATION 123 (P. Weber, ed. 1990).
24. Madison's "neutral" approach is distinct from Jefferson's "separationist"
approach which advocated "a wall of separation between church and state." Id.
25. Paulsen, supra note 18, at 333.
26. "[SJtrict neutrality is committed to the proposition that there is seldom a
legally significant characteristic of religion so unique that it is not shared by similar
nonreligious individuals or groups (emphasis in the original)." Weber, Neutrality
and First Amendment Interpretation, in EQUAL SEPARATION 9 (P. Weber ed. 1990)
[hereinafter Weber].
27. Monsma considers this interpretation to be essential because it encourages
religious organizations to continue to play an active, constructive (yet limited) role
in modern American society. To accomplish this, he believes that:
the free exercise clause must be broadly interpreted to allow
religious organizations to act freely, also when receiving
governmental funds in support of secular programs, as long as
there are checks to assure that their actions do no endanger the
social order or the health and safety of the community or
themselves, and do not misspend public funds, thereby violating
the secular goals or purposes for which they received them . . .
[and] . . . the establishment clause must be interpreted to allow
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such circumstances, the level of judicial review or scrutiny is the same
for the religious interests as for the similarly situated secular interests.
Thus, for example, if the government distributes surplus foodstuffs,
such as cheese and milk, through local organizations, it could neither
exclude religious organizations from participating in the program nor
grant them exclusive rights to participate over other interested groups.
Because the religious organizations are similarly situated to other
local charitable groups, they should be treated the same. If these
interests are involved in litigation, the judicial scrutiny should be the
same for the religious institution as for the secular organization.
When, however, religious interests are uniquely situated, i.e.
there is no similarly situated secular counterpart, or when the purpose
of governmental classifications is to produce varying effects upon the
free exercise of religion, the strict neutrality principle mandates that
a strict scrutiny standard be used by the courts."8 Such scrutiny would
be triggered when a claim is based upon a uniquely religious belief.29
Strict scrutiny would also be triggered when a significant burden has
been placed upon religious activity as a result of a seemingly neutral
governmental recognition and accommodation of secularly and
religiously based organizations alike, as long as they are given
without discrimination, and to allow governmental aid in support
of activities or religious groups which have a secular goal or
purpose (even though religious beliefs and goals are intertwined
with the secular goals and purposes.
Monsma, The Neutrality Principle and a Pluralist Concept of Accommodation, in
EQUAL SEPARATION 73 (P. Weber ed. 1990).
28. See Weber, supra note 27, at 9-10.
29. Id. Examples of uniquely religious beliefs include, but are not limited to:
a Seventh-Day Adventist who cannot work on Saturdays, her Sabbath day; a
Mennonite who refuses to have her picture placed on her driver's licence; a Baptist
church that requires all of its employees to be members of the church; an Amish
family that refuses to send their children to public school after completion of the
eighth grade. But see Kelley, supra note 20, at 18-40.
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law.30 In these cases, religion would be treated as a suspect
classification where "any statute utilizing religion or specifically
impacting on religion is automatically suspect, will demand a very
heavy burden of justification, and will be subject to the most rigorous
scrutiny."57 A compelling state interest will overcome a burden on a
fundamental right under strict scrutiny. When an impermissible
burden is found to have been placed upon religious freedom, the
religious belief or activity will be considered exempt from the
regulation involved.
In addition, strict scrutiny ensures that religious activities52 and
organizations are not categorically excluded by operation of the
establishment clause from statutes having legitimate secular purposes
which otherwise warrant their inclusion. For example, a categorical
exemption from all tax laws for religious organizations would violate
the establishment clause by impermissibly preferring religious over
secular interests and would greatly reduce the amount of revenue
30. For example, compulsory education of minors until age 16, while a
seemingly neutral governmental regulation, may impose significant burdens upon
the exercise of religion where the life of the family is permeated by religious
values. In such cases, the strict neutrality principle does allow for an exemption.
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
The rationale for the strict scrutiny requirement is similar to the rationale
mandating heightened scrutiny for racial and gender discrimination. Paulsen states
that classification due to a religious "purpose" is not always improper; it simply
requires "a more probing examination" than when no such purpose is involved.
Paulsen, supra note 18, at 340. He justifies strict scrutiny under the neutrality
principle by stating that a policy that on its face intends to have specific effects on
religion calls attention to itself as a policy affecting a fundamental right and
employing a classification that is, in terms of first amendment freedoms of religious
exercise and nonexercise, highly suspicious. Presumptively, at least, classifications
along religious lines have effects upon the exercise of religious liberty.
Id. at 341.
31. Weber, supra note 26, at 10.
32. Analysis of the two religion clauses typically revolves around religious
beliefs and activities. In keeping to this distinction, the word "activities" is defined
broadly in this article to include not only the traditional activities, but also
decisions such as whether to act. For example, a religious institution's decision on
how to utilize its property is considered an "activity."
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that the government could collect. Such an exemption would
encourage proliferation of businesses claiming religious exemptions in
order to avoid paying taxes. This would then entangle the
government and the courts in determining the validity of such claims.
Strict scrutiny would also require the government to
demonstrate that its legitimate secular regulations that do have an
impact on religious liberty employ the '"least-entangling-means"1 to
achieve their objectives/3 For example, a statute which requires
religious organizations to withhold taxes from employees' salaries
should require as proof only those financial records necessary to
demonstrate compliance with the statutory requirements rather than
a detailed inquiry into church finances.
McConnell has identified three specific areas where strict
scrutiny should be applied in order to preserve religious freedom:
(1) When religious practice is suppressed or inhibited
as an incidental consequence of facially neutral
governmental action;5'' (2) when enforcement of a
neutral regulatory scheme would interfere with a
religious organization's internal structure and doctrine,55
and (3) when the governmental presence is so pervasive
that religious exercise would be impossible in the
33. Paulsen, supra note 18, at 331. Paulsen also suggests that unnecessary
entanglement by the government in any of its regulations triggers intermediate
scrutiny by the courts. Id. This seems redundant given that governmental policies
affecting religious freedom are subject to strict scrutiny. The means that the
government chooses to implement its policies would likely be examined by the
court at the same level at the same time. For the court to examine the effects
under a higher standard of review than the examination of the means which created
the effects would be illogical.
34. For example, a national prohibition against alcohol consumption is a
neutral government regulation. If applied without a religious exception, however,
it would impermissibly burden religious freedom by compelling Roman Catholics
to either violate the law or to give up celebration of the eucharist, a ceremony
requiring consumption of wine.
35. This typically would involve government regulations concerning ownership
of church property when a congregation splits into separate factions, mandatory
hiring practices for all levels of church employees, or church membership criteria.
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absence of affirmative accommodation.56
Depending upon the facts of the cases falling within each of the
three areas, this level of review may result in a religious exemption
from the regulation at issue.
Thus, the strict neutrality approach to interpretation of first
amendment religious freedom,reflects a "willingness [by] American
society to spread the costs . . . of religious toleration and
accommodation."57 Only when these costs actually impair one's
freedom of exercise or non-exercise or result in discrimination from
the exercise or non-exercise of one's beliefs does the believer or non-
believer have an objection to a regulation.58 Consequently, when a
regulation's religious classification produces a disproportionate impact
upon religious beliefs or activities, the costs of free exercise should be
weighed, not against the regulation itself, but against the effect
caused by granting an exemption to the regulation.59
This balancing formulation is important for two reasons. First,
it explicitly recognizes that, where a compelling governmental interest
is involved, the attainment of the objectives behind the regulation
might be more significantly impeded by granting an exemption to the
rule than would be caused by requiring compliance with the rule.40
36. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 151
(1986) [hereinafter McConnell]. For example, in prisons and military installations.
37. Paulsen, supra note 18, at 337.
38. For example, working on Saturdays would burden the religious freedom of
a Seventh Day Adventist or a Jew but would not curtail the religious freedom of
a Catholic or an atheist. Under the strict neutrality principle, only those persons
whose religious freedom is actually'burdened by a regulation can object to its
effects and seek an exemption. Those not burdened do not need the exemption.
Id.
39. Id. at 338.
40. For example, generating revenues, in part through imposition of sales and
retail taxes, is a compelling governmental interest. Imposing the tax upon religious
materials sold by religious institutions would broaden the tax base and increase the
amount of revenue received by the state government. Payment of such taxes would
decrease the amount of money available to the religious organization to support
its religious and charitable mission, however, thus imposing a burden upon the
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Second, it also evaluates implicitly whether a regulation's religious
classifications closely relate to the burden upon religious freedom
which is to be removed. This must be done in order to minimize the
appearance and practice of religious favoritism.
The Modified Strict Neutrality Test41
The modified strict neutrality principle proposed in this article
has three prongs. The first prong is whether the activity is uniquely
religious or affected in differing ways as a result of governmental
classifications, or whether the activity is one performed by secular
organizations similarly situated to the religious institution. If the
activity is uniquely religious or affected as a result of governmental
classifications, then strict scrutiny should be applied. If the activity
is one performed by similarly situated secular organizations, then
rational basis scrutiny should be applied.
The second prong is whether one of three potential categories
of exemption from the governmental regulation apply to the religious
activity at issue. The three categories are: 1) suppression or
inhibition of religious practice resulting from the incidental effects of
neutral governmental regulations; 2) interference with the internal
structure or doctrine of religious organizations through a regulation's
exercise of religion. Granting an exemption from such taxes for religious
institutions would significantly impair the government's ability to operate by
decreasing state revenues. Because the effect of granting an exemption to a
regulation involving a compelling governmental interest would significantly impede
attainment of the governmental objectives behind the regulation, the exemption
should not be granted. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization,
110 S. Ct. 688 (1990).
41. Kurland's strict neutrality principle was aimed primarily at resolving the
tensions between interpretations and application of the free exercise of religion
clause and the establishment clause by proposing a single, coherent interpretation
which utilized both clauses. The recent modifications have attempted to formulate
a test that embodies the concepts underlying Kurland's strict neutrality principle.
Because the proposed tests are similar, this article combines these various similar
approaches into a single test.
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enforcement mechanism; and 3) pervasive governmental presence
making religious practice impossible absent affirmative
accommodation. If any one of the three categories is applicable to
the issue being analyzed, the third prong of the test is triggered.
The third prong of the test is whether the costs of free
exercise outweigh the effects of granting an exemption from the
governmental regulation. This analysis utilizes the strict scrutiny
standard. If the costs of free exercise outweigh the effects of
granting the exemption, then the exemption should be granted. If
the costs of free exercise do not outweigh the effects of granting the
exemption, then the exemption should not be granted. This
balancing portion of the test ensures that important governmental
interests will not be affected adversely by granting exemptions.
The modified strict neutrality principle provides a workable
approach to the current confusion surrounding interpretation of the
religion clauses. It protects fundamental religious freedom by
applying the strict scrutiny standard. It does not grant religious
beliefs and activities an absolute preference, however, by placing
them outside of the authority and control of governmental
regulations. Nor does the modified strict neutrality principle subject
all activity motivated by religious purposes to the same standard.
Such an approach would grant preferential treatment to religious
organizations that perform functions also performed by similarly
situated secular organizations. Instead, all similarly situated groups,
both religious and secular, are treated alike under the rational basis
standard.
Furthermore, the modified strict neutrality principle recognizes
that no approach provides all solutions and, consequently, permits
exceptions from governmental regulation where unique religious
beliefs or activities are involved. Religious interests will yield only if
the effect of granting an exemption does not outweigh the compelling
governmental interests underlying the regulation. Likewise,
governmental regulations are not presumed valid to the point of
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subordinating religious beliefs and activities to secular concerns.
Thus, the modified strict neutrality principle provides a workable test
which balances religious, governmental and secular interests.
Religious interests are not segregated by creation of an artificial wall
between church and state. Rather, religious interests are recognized
as an integral part of modern American society because they perform
many of the same functions provided by secular organizations and by
an active, administrative government.
APPLICATION OF THE STRICT NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE TO
RELIGIOUS LANDMARK CASES
The most recent and controversial religious landmark case -
St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York42 -- is the focus of the
remainder of this article. St. Bartholomew's Church is the first
religious landmarks case to be adjudicated by the federal courts.43
The Supreme Court's recent denial of certiorari^ suggests that the
Second Circuit's opinion will be a leading authority for the near
future.
The District Court's Decision
St. Bartholomew's Church (Church), located on Park Avenue
in New York City, was designated as a historic landmark in 1967.
Between December 1983 and October 1986, the Church repeatedly
42. 728 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert,
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
43. All other cases have been heard in state courts. See Second Baptist
Church v. Little Rock Dist. Comm'n, 293 Ark. 155, 732 S.W.2d 483 (1987); Church
of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, 67 N.Y.2d 510, 496 N.E.2d 183, 505 N.Y.S.2d
24 (1986); Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 51 N.Y.2d 499, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434
N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980); Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d
121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974); First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 114
Wash.2d 392, 787 P.2d 1352 (1990).
44. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on March 4, 1991. Ill S. Ct. 1103
(1991).
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applied for a certificate of appropriateness from the New York City
Landmarks Preservation Commission to proceed with demolition
plans. After repeated denials of its applications and a denial of its
claim of financial hardship, the Church brought suit in federal district
court alleging numerous violations of its guaranteed first amendment
religious freedoms/5
First, the Church claimed that the landmarks ordinance was
facially unconstitutional because the regulation's impact upon church
property violated the free exercise of religion/6 Second, the Church
claimed that the ordinance was unconstitutional as applied because
the denial of the certificates of appropriateness interfered with the
free exercise of religion/7 Finally, the Church claimed that the
ordinance was unconstitutional, both facially and as applied, because
the economic hardship application process constituted an
impermissible intrusion into the internal affairs of the Church in
violation of the establishment clause/*
The district court first examined the applicable free exercise
and establishment clause tests to determine whether the landmarks
ordinance violated either clause/9 The focus of the court's review
centered upon the denial of the Church's application for an economic
hardship exception, as this was the heart of the Church's free exercise
claim.50 The district court stated that a statute violates the free
exercise clause when it either coerces an affected individual into
violating his or her religious beliefs or denies an affected individual
an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges accorded to
45. St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 728 F. Supp. 958
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
46. Id. at 962.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 962-3.
50. Id. at 967-74.
STRICT NEUTRALITY AND RELIGIOUS LANDMARKS 15
other individuals, thus penalizing religious activity.57 The court found
that the New York landmarks ordinance did not penalize religious
activity when it imposed obligations upon owners of landmarked
property which were not imposed upon owners of nonlandmarked
property.52 Because the ordinance specifically provided that all
owners of landmarked property have the same right to request a
certificate of appropriateness in order to alter their property, there
was no violation of the free exercise clause.55 In addition, the court
noted that religious institutions are free to seek a certificate of
appropriateness where the landmarked property can no longer be
used to carry out the church's religious and charitable missions.54
The Church's claim that a statute which produces any impact
upon a religious organization must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest was also rejected.55 The court stated that a
compelling state interest is required only when a statute impermissibly
burdens the free exercise of religion.56 As the landmarks ordinance
had already been found by the court to not burden the free exercise
of religion, there was no reason to require the government to
demonstrate a compelling state interest.57
Focusing upon the "entanglement" prong of the Lemon v.
Kurtzman establishment clause test,58 the district court found that the
51. Id. at 963. This test was set forth in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988).
52. Id. at 964.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 963.
55. Id. at 963 n.9.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The three-part Lemon test
requires that 1) a statute must have a secular legislative purpose, 2) a statute's
primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and 3) a statute must not
foster excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13.
In determining whether a statute involves excessive government
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landmarks ordinance did not excessively entangle the state in church
operations.59 Specifically, no excessive entanglement was found
because the governmental inquiry into the Church's finances was
done for the limited purpose of determining the validity of the
economic hardship claim.60
The district court also rejected the Church's claim that the
economic hardship provision of the landmarks ordinance violated the
equal protection clause because a different test was applied to
commercial organizational owners of landmarked property than was
applied to charitable (including religious) institutional owners of
landmarked property.67 The court noted that commercial
organizations are not similarly situated to charitable institutions and
thus "it would make little sense, and might in fact be irrational, to
apply the charitable test62 to a commercial property or the
entanglement, the factors to be considered by a court include the character and
purposes of the organizations that are benefited, the nature of the governmental
aid provided, and the resulting relationship between the government and the
religious institution. Id.
59. St. Bartholomew's Church, 728 F. Supp. at 963.
60. Id. at 963. The court further noted that the establishment clause is usually
triggered in cases involving governmental aid to religious institutions where church
finances must be extensively and continuously monitored to ensure that the
government funds were only used for secular purposes. Id.
61. Id. at 964.
62. The economic hardship test for charitable organizations allows the
landmark designation to remain only if the designation restrictions do not prevent
or seriously interfere with the carrying out of the charitable purpose. This test was
first announced in Sailor's Snug Harbor v. Plait, 29 A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314
(App. Div. 1968).
The judicially created charitable organizations test was established by the
courts as a counterpart to the statutorily created commercial enterprises test. The
statutory test not only granted an economic hardship waiver from the obligations
of the landmarks ordinance but also listed a variety of alternative measures to
demolition should the landmarked properly not provide the statutorily set rate of
return on investment. The scheme effectively prevented charitable organizations
from receiving an economic hardship waiver and from taking advantage of the
demolition alternative provisions because their non-profit properties, by definition,
were not utilized to provide a rate of return on investment. This test was first
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commercial test65 to a charitable property."64
The court then addressed the Church's claim that the
economic hardship provisions, as applied, were unconstitutional as a
violation of their right to the free exercise of religion.65 The district
court held that in order to trigger the economic hardship provisions
the Church had to demonstrate that the community house, which it
wanted to demolish, was inadequate to fulfill its charitable functions.66
The district court found as a matter of fact that the Church failed to
meet its burden of proof on this issue.67
The Second Circuit Analysis
On appeal, St. Bartholomew's claimed that the decision of the
district court was clearly erroneous as to its finding that there was no
violation of the right to free exercise of religion.68 The Second
Circuit affirmed the district court decision, however, and stated that
the right of free exercise still requires individuals to comply with
applied to religious landmarks in Lutheran Church in America v. City of New
York, 35 N.Y.Zd 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974) and has been
consistently applied to religious landmarks since 1974.
63. The economic hardship test for commercial organizations is based upon the
ability of an organization to earn a reasonable return from its property. This test
is set by statute as part of the landmarks ordinance under N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE
§ 207-8.0(a)(l)(a).
64. St. Bartholomew's Church, 728 F. Supp. at 964.
65. Id. at 965-74.
66. The parties had previously agreed to hold a bench trial on the evidence
that had been submitted to the Commission. The court reviewed this evidence
de novo. Its findings of fact and conclusions of law were based upon this evidence.
For a detailed examination of the facts of the case, see Trial Brief, Amid curiae,
in Support of Defendants' Trial Brief, St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New
York (86 Civ. 2848 (JES)) (1988).
67. The court stated that the Church must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that it could no longer carry out its religious mission within the
community house. St. Bartholomew's Church, 728 F. Supp. at 974-75.
68. St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 353 (2d Cir.
1990), cert, denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
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valid, neutral laws of general applicability.69 The court found that the
"critical distinction is thus between a neutral, generally applicable law
that happens to bear on religiously motivated action, and a regulation
that restricts certain conduct because it is religiously oriented."70
The court recognized that the designation of the property as
an historic landmark diminished the market value of the property77
but stated that recent Supreme Court decisions72 indicate that the
free exercise clause is not implicated where neutral governmental
regulations reduce the value of income to religious institutions.73
Moreover, governmental regulations that produce incidental effects
upon the free exercise of religion do not require the government to
justify its actions by showing a compelling interest even where those
effects may make it more difficult to practice certain religions.7''
Rather, the free exercise clause is implicated where those effects may
tend, either directly or indirectly, to coerce or penalize individuals
into acting contrary to their religious beliefs.75
The Second Circuit stated that the burden is on the plaintiff
to prove violations of the free exercise clause stemming from the
69. Id. at 354.
70. Id. The Second Circuit then went on to state that the neutral criteria set
forth in the ordinance for designating property an historic landmark "is not
evidence of an intent to discriminate against, or impinge on, religious belief even
though the landmarks ordinance affects many religious structures. Id.
71. St. Bartholomew's Church and associated buildings and gardens would be
extremely valuable for commercial purposes without the landmark designation. The
Second Circuit noted that this diminution in value had "drastically restricted" the
Church's ability to raise revenues with which to fund its charitable and religious
activities. Id. at 355.
72. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 110 S. Ct. 688 (1990);
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
73. St. Bartholomew's Church, 914 F.2d at 355.
74. Id. at 355, relying on Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439 (1988).
75. Id.
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effects of landmark designation of church property.76 The court will
find violations if the church can show discriminatory motive and
either coercion in religious practice or an inability to carry out its
religious activities in existing buildings.77
The Second Circuit held that the findings and conclusions of
the district court regarding the Church's claim of financial hardship78
were not clearly erroneous.79 Thus, since the Church failed to meet
its burden of proof, the Second Circuit upheld the district court
decision regarding the Church's free exercise claim.80
76. Id. at 355-6.
77. Id. The Second Circuit specifically stated the burden of proof only in
terms of religious mission. Presumably this would also include charitable activities
conducted as part of its religious ministries.
78. On appeal, St. Bartholomew's Church did not "seriously defend" their $11
million estimate of the cost of repairs to the community house and, instead,
accepted the S3 million estimate found by the district court to be a reasonable
costs of repairs. Id. at 358.
79. Id. at 360. The court noted that the Church presented no evidence to
refute the contention that a phased renovation under a reasonable financing
procedure would not severely damage their financial situation. Nor did the Church
present evidence to refute the contention that options other than a withdrawal of
funds from the endowment principal sufficient to cover all repairs up front, such
as loans or gradual withdrawal of funds from the endowment principal, were not
financially feasible. Such proof would have bolstered the Church's claim that they
were unable to fulfill their religious and charitable missions if demolition and
subsequent construction plans were not approved. The circuit court noted that
without such information, the district court decision could not be found clearly
erroneous. Id. at 358-60.
80. Id. at 360. In footnote 4, the court also discussed the establishment clause
claim that had been dismissed by the district court as inapplicable to the case at
bar. The Second Circuit noted that, in light of the recent Jimmy Swaggart decision,
excessive entanglement between church and state will not be found where the
administrative and recordkeeping obligations are routine, do not require continuous
surveillance of the religious institution, and do not require inquiries into either the
motives of the religious organization or the doctrine of the religious institution.
The landmarks ordinance meets this test (inquiry is limited to financial and
architectural matters required to meet application requirements). Therefore, this
"degree of interaction does not rise to the level of unconstitutional entanglement."
Id. at 356.
20 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
ANALYSIS OF ST. BARTHOLOMEW'S CHURCH
UNDER THE STRICT NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE
The First Prong of the Strict Neutrality Test
If the free exercise of religion claim in St. Bartholomew's
Church had been analyzed using the strict neutrality principle, the
final decision would have been the same. The reasoning, however,
would have emphasized a balancing of both governmental and
religious interests rather than a mechanical application of existing
free exercise tests. The first prong of the test requires a
determination of whether the Church's decision on how best to utilize
its landmarked property is an activity either uniquely religious or one
that is affected in differing ways as a result of governmental
classifications or is performed by secular organizations similarly
situated to the religious institution/7
Although a religious institution's decision on the use of its
property is a religious activity, it cannot be considered a uniquely
religious activity.*2 All property owners must decide what to do with
their property. Each property owner's decision reflects his or her
view of what best furthers his or her interests, just as a religious
organization's decision seeks to further its religious mission.
Therefore, the decision on how to utilize church property is not a
81. A church's decision on where to build its house of worship is arguably a
uniquely religious decision on how best to utilize church property. In
Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (7th Cir.),
cert, denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983), the Seventh Circuit held zoning regulations
limiting construction of churches to 10% of the city constitutional. The court
stated that construction of a house of worship was not a fundamental tenet of the
religion involved and that there was no constitutional right for religious
organizations to build where they choose.
If construction of a house of worship is not considered a uniquely religious
activity, then it seems very unlikely that a court will find a church's decision to
make alterations to church property to be a uniquely religious activity. This seems
particularly true where the alterations are to accessory buildings and not to the
house of worship itself.
82. See supra note 32.
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uniquely religious activity.85 Likewise, because all owners of
landmarked property are subject to the same restrictions and
requirements under the ordinance, a decision on how to utilize
landmarked church property also cannot be considered a uniquely
religious activity.
The landmarks ordinance arguably creates a governmental
classification (owners of landmarked property v. owners of non-
landmarked property) that produces different effects upon religious
organizations. The strict neutrality principle refers to governmental
classifications contained in a statute, however, and not to
classifications resulting from operation of the statute. Because the
landmarks ordinance does not include classification categories,*4 this
portion of the first prong of the test is inapplicable to the case at
hand.
Unless the landmark ordinance clearly distinguishes between
types of property owners, all owners of landmarked property must
adhere to the same restrictions and incur the same obligations
whether they are individual or institutional owners. Imposition of
these duties alone, however, does not make all owners of landmarked
property similarly situated to each other. What is significant is
whether the owners are similarly situated as to the type of ownership,
83. If clearly religious activity alone qualified as a uniquely religious activity,
then all actions conducted by a religious organization would require strict scrutiny
and a compelling governmental interest to overcome. Obviously more is required
to qualify as a uniquely religious activity.
84. Classification should not be confused with criteria. Classification for the
purpose of applying the strict neutrality principle means that the government has
included within a statute various categories or classifications. The statute then has
varying effects upon religious organizations depending upon the category into
which an organization is placed. Varying effects will also be produced if one of
the classifications is religiously based.
Criteria, on the other hand, are those factors used to determine whether
or not the statute is applicable to the organization or property. Criteria are also
those factors used to determine which statutory classification is applicable to an
organization or property.
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i.e. residential, commercial, nonprofit. The type of ownership
remains the dominant factor influencing the decision making process
for each owner. Residential and commercial owners have investment-
backed expectations regarding their properties; that is, each expects
to receive a reasonable rate of return on their investments.
On the other hand, nonprofit owners have different
expectations because of their nonprofit status.85 Charitable
institutions expect their property investments to primarily carry out
their charitable purposes. Religious institutions are nonprofit
organizations. Therefore, only other nonprofit institutions owning
landmarked property are similarly situated to religious institutions
owning landmarked property.
Thus, under the first prong of the strict neutrality principle a
decision by a religious organization on how best to utilize its
landmarked property is considered an act that is also performed by
other, similarly situated (i.e., nonprofit) organizations. Consequently,
analysis of the constitutionality of the statute will utilize the rational
basis standard and the statute will be upheld if it bears a reasonable
relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. Because the
Supreme Court has already stated that the New York landmarks
ordinance is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose8*5
-- the preservation of state and national historic landmarks — this
point is not at issue.
The Second Prong of the Strict Neutrality Test
In contrast to the approach taken by the district court and
the Second Circuit in the present case, religious institutions that fail
the first prong of the strict neutrality test are not without further
85. These differing expectations resulting from the differing types or purposes
of property ownership is what led the New York courts to adopt an independent
charitable purpose test for nonprofit organizations. St. Bartholomew's Church v.
City of New York, 728 F. Supp. 958, 964, 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
86. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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recourse. The second prong of the strict neutrality principle requires
determining whether one of the three potential categories of
exemption from the landmarks ordinance is applicable to the religious
activity at issue. The third prong of the test is triggered if any one
of the three categories of exemptions is applicable.
The First Exemption
The first ground for exemption requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the statute's87 incidental effects result in the
suppression or inhibition of religious practice. In the present case,
the Church could claim that the ordinance's use restrictions inhibit
its religious practice by requiring the Church to expend its financial
resources on property maintenance and upkeep which the Church
would rather spend on other charitable purposes. Preservation of
landmarks through mandatory repair and upkeep obligations appears
to be a primary purpose of the statute, however, rather than an
incidental effect. Assuming that these obligations are an incidental
effect, the question becomes whether the Church's religious practice
is actually inhibited.*9 Inhibition would be a question of fact to be
determined by the trial court using the strict scrutiny standard.
If the court found that religious practice had been inhibited,
the statute would be upheld only if it represented the least restrictive
means to accomplish a compelling state interest. The state applied
the least restrictive means given that the statute provides a
mechanism for relief from the obligations imposed. The key issue is
whether preservation 'of historic landmarks constitutes a compelling
state interest. No court has squarely addressed this point. In Penn
87. The statute in question must be a neutral governmental regulation. The
New York landmarks ordinance is a neutral governmental regulation that does not
include religious classifications and is not aimed at religious activity.
88. Note that under this formulation, any inhibited religious practice does not
necessarily mean that the Church will be in a position to claim economic hardship.
There may be inhibitions of religious practice which nevertheless do not meet the
criteria for economic hardship.
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Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,89 the Supreme Court
identified historic preservation as "substantially related" to promotion
of the general welfare but did not specifically identify it as a
compelling state interest.90 Assuming that a court would find historic
preservation to be a compelling state interest,97 the Church would
then move to the third prong of the strict neutrality test in order to
see if the Church may qualify for an exemption.
The Second Exemption
The second ground for exemption requires the plaintiff to
show that the enforcement mechanism of the statute interferes with
the internal structure or doctrine of its religious organization.92 The
Church alleged that the statute's requirement that the Commission
review the Church's financial records in order to determine the
validity of the hardship claim was an impermissible intrusion into the
internal operation of the Church.9S The district court dismissed this
89. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
90. Id. at 129, 131.
91. If historic preservation is not found to be a compelling state interest then
the Church's claim will be upheld and the landmarks ordinance will be held
inapplicable to religious institutions.
92. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
93. Secular approval for church decisions is not unique to the landmarks
ordinance, however. Compliance with zoning ordinances and building codes and
vehicle safety inspections prior to registration are two of many instances where
secular approval is required before permits or other forms of approval may be
obtained in the furtherance of church purposes involving church resources.
Burdens of this nature have been justified as a permissible extension of the state's
police power where important or compelling governmental interests, such as the
health, safety, and general welfare of the cili/enry, are involved. Likewise, use
restrictions have also been held to be a permissible extension of the police power
where a property owner has not been deprived of all reasonable use of the
property. Thus, these claims in and of themselves are not enough to find a
violation of the free exercise clause. Assuming that the burdens on the free
exercise of religion are heavy enough to warrant qualifying for an exemption, then
the third prong of the strict neu t ra l i ty test must be met using the strict scrutiny
standard.
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claim, stating that the examination was permissible because it was for
the limited purpose of ascertaining the validity of a financial hardship
claim.94 Under the strict neutrality principle, this provision would be
analyzed under the strict scrutiny standard discussed above.
The Third Exemption
The third ground for exemption requires the plaintiff to prove
that its religious practice is impossible, absent affirmative
accommodation, due to pervasive governmental presence caused by
the regulation.95 This exemption is perhaps the weakest ground for
avoiding New York's landmarks ordinance. It would be difficult to
argue that the regulation and its obligations make religious practice
impossible or that the governmental presence is pervasive. Assuming
that a claim could be made, however, the court would use the strict
scrutiny standard discussed above.
The Third Prong of the Strict Neutrality Test
Finally, under the third prong of the strict neutrality principle,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the benefits of honoring free
exercise of religion outweigh the negative effects of granting an
exemption from the landmarks ordinance.96 In the present case,
granting an exemption from the landmarks ordinance independent of
the statutory exemption would effectively exclude church-owned
property from the landmarks preservation program. A total church
exemption would significantly reduce the ability of states to preserve
important historic resources and could disable preservation programs
in states with a large proportion of church-owned property. This
seems a high price to pay in order to avoid free exercise of religion
94. St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 728 F. Supp. 958, 963
(S.D. N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103
(1991).
95. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
96. This exemption is separate from, and independent of, the economic
hardship exemption already available under the landmarks ordinance.
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conflicts.
On the other hand, granting the exemption would allow
religious organizations greater freedom in determining how to spend
their money and best utilize their properties for the benefit of church
members and the community. Under this cost/benefit analysis, the
benefits of free exercise do not outweigh the negative effects of
granting an exemption from the landmarks ordinance. Consequently,
the exemption should not be granted. Limiting religious organizations
to the statutory exemptions provides a fair opportunity for such
institutions to remove themselves from the obligations of the
landmarks ordinance.97
The analysis of Si. Bartholomew's Church under the strict
neutrality principle is similar to the analysis of the district court,
which was affirmed by the Second Circuit. The district court,
applying equal protection principles, officially recognized that religious
institutions that own landmarked property are similarly situated to
secular charitable organizations that own landmarked property.98
This similarity is the central premise of the strict neutrality principle.
The court also emphasized similarly situated organizations when it
discussed the validity of the Commission's denial of the Church's
application for a certificate of appropriateness." Moreover, the
district court noted that the free exercise test was applicable for
affected individuals/00 This limitation is similar to the strict neutrality
principle, which emphasizes that what affects one religion does not
necessarily affect all religions. Therefore, only those persons or
organizations actually burdened by the governmental regulation may
97. An exemption was granted from the New York landmarks ordinance in
Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.Zd 121, 316 N.E.2d
305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
98. St. Bartholomew's Church, 728 F. Supp. at 963.
99. Id. at 963-4.
100. Id. at 963.
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challenge the regulation.
CONCLUSION
The strict neutrality principle offers a workable solution to the
problem of historic landmark designation and the infringement of
religious freedoms raised in St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New
York.101 First, the strict neutrality principle provides a single, coherent
framework from which to analyze issues involving free exercise and
establishment clause claims. The greater depth of analysis under this
principle ensures that both the governmental and religious interests
are adequately, if not thoroughly, addressed. At the same time, this
greater analysis also ensures that both parties believe that their
interests have been considered and not merely given cursory
treatment. The district court's approach, by contrast, utilizes a
variety of tests with comparatively little analysis compared to that
employed under the strict neutrality principle.
Second, the strict neutrality principle provides a single test
that can be used by the courts whether the religious activity is one
performed by similarly situated secular organizations (requiring the
rational basis test) or whether the activity is uniquely religious or
affected by differing results from application of a neutral
governmental regulation (requiring the strict scrutiny standard). This
minimizes the problems that the courts have had in distinguishing
between similar religious claims.
Third, application of the strict neutrality principle to religious
landmarks cases produces a neutral middle ground for problem
resolution which favors neither religious interests nor governmental
concerns. Within the context of governmental regulations of historic
landmarks, the strict neutrality principle provides a viable structure
for evaluating and analyzing claims without an inherent bias towards
101. 728 F. Supp. 958 (S.D. N.Y. 1989), affd, 914 F. 2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990),
cert, denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
28 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
either the religious interests or the government. Courts have typically
avoided the first amendment issues in cases involving religious
landmarks because an objective analysis of each party's claim is so
difficult.
Finally, the strict neutrality principle provides a single
framework for finding a neutral alternative or for determining when
exemptions from landmarks ordinances are warranted. Again, this
provides an equitable solution which avoids the problem of favoritism.
The first amendment does not place religious exercise outside of
governmental regulation, nor does it place it in a subordinate
position. Under the strict neutrality principle, this status is
maintained.
The preceding analysis, although applied to a New York case,
is fully applicable to cases arising in Virginia and other states with a
significant number of landmarked church properties/02 Landmark
designation imposes affirmative obligations upon property owners to
maintain and repair their properties in compliance with guidelines
and decisions made by local landmark preservation committees.
Exemptions from these obligations are possible where property
owners can demonstrate financial hardship caused by compliance with
the landmarks ordinance. Where the property owner is a religious
organization, these obligations may impair the right to free exercise
of religion and cause excessive entanglement between church and
state in violation of the establishment clause. The strict neutrality
principle provides a viable solution to this conflict surrounding
church-owned historic landmarks.
102. Over 150 church owned landmarks in Virginia are listed in the Virginia
State Landmarks Registry and in the National Register of Historic Places. This
represents over 10% of all landmarks designated in Virginia. VIRGINIA
LANDMARKS REG. (C. Loth ed. 1986).
